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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA F JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellee

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs
ALAN D JONES,

Oral Argument Requested
Case No. 2004-0192CA

Defendant-Appellant

DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Lynda F Jones, a natural
person. The Defendant-Appellant

is Alan D Jones, a

natural person. The parties are former spouses to each
other, having been divorced in 1992.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA F JONES,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs

Oral Argument Requested

ALAN D JONES,

Case No. 2004-0192CA

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to
the

provision

[appeals

of

from

Section

district

78-2a-3 (2) (h) , Utah
court

involving

Code

domestic

relations].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues for review:
1.

Whether or not the trial court abused its

discretion in modifying the alimony award to
an amount

greatly

in excess

of

the payor

spouse's ability to pay and greatly in excess
of the needs of the recipient spouse.
2.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion in making the modification of the
alimony award prospectively from the time of
the order of modification, rather than from
the time the petition for modification was
filed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married in 1968. In 1991 the
Plaintiff filed for divorce, which was granted in 1992.
At the time of the divorce, the Defendant [Mr Jones]
was earning in excess of $5,000 per month. The original
Decree of Divorce provided for an alimony award of $900
per month, which would increase to $1400 per month when
the parties' youngest child reached the age of 18 and
the $500 monthly child support would terminate.
Pursuant to the original Decree, Mr Jones paid the
$16,8 00 annualized alimony

for about

eight years,

paying Mrs Jones in excess of one hundred thousand
dollars.
In 1992 he
company

as a Sales Manager for a regional

(Lawson)

was earning

in excess of fifty

thousand dollars per year. [His income varied, based
upon the percentage of commissions "override" earned by
the numerous salesmen he supervised.] In 2000 Mr Jones'
employer

(Lawson)

restructured

the

compensation

schedule paid to Mr Jones and other sales managers: his
compensation dropped from the annual $60,000-range he
had been earning to $23,000 per year. His duties would
have

remained

the

same.

Rather

than

accept

the

diminished compensation, he severed his relationship
with his former employer and sought other employment.

Mr Jones has been unable to find employment which
pays him anywhere near his former earnings. Major
medical problems have restricted, albeit temporarily,
his employment. Currently he earns about $17,000 per
year in wages.
Presently, Mrs Jones

having no dependents, in

acknowledged good health, and capable of supporting
herself

earns $50,000 per year.

In

October

2001

Mr

Jones

petitioned

for

a

modification of the alimony award, based upon his
diminished ability to pay.
The District Court ultimately reduced the alimony
award to $500 per month, which the Appellant [Mr Jones]
believes

is

still

excessive,

given

the

recipient

spouse's ability to support herself [on her $50,000+
per year annual income] and his extremely diminished
ability to pay alimony.
During the modification proceedings the District
Court

entered

an

order

tentatively

reducing

the

Defendant's alimony support obligation to $100 per
month

[July 2003; RECORD at page 207; EXHIBIT #1,

hereto]; however, as the modification proceeded to
towards

finality,

the

District

Court

entered

a

"judgment" against the Defendant for approximately
$30,000 as unpaid arrearages of alimony, thus ignoring

3

its previous order and further allowing the PlaintiffAppellee a "double recovery", as explained herein.
This appeal ensued.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO PAY
$500 PER MONTH ALIMONY,
SAID AMOUNT GREATLY IN EXCESS
OF THE RECIPIENTS NEEDS
AND HER OWN ABILITY TO EARN
INCOME AND CREATING A "SERIOUSLY INEQUITABLE" RESULT
In divorce cases, the District Court is granted
"broad discretion" in making alimony determinations,
and those determinations will not be disturbed on
appeal

unless

the

"misunderstanding

alimony
or

award

results

misapplication

of

from
the

a
law

resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo vs Naranjo, 751
P. 2d 1144 at 1146. Emphasis added. See also English vs
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah Supreme Court 1977), Eames
vs Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Appeals 1987) , and Ring vs
Ring, 29 Utah 2nd 436, 511 P. 2d 155 (Utah Supreme Court
1973) ["manifest injustice" exception].
In the present case the $6,000 per year alimony
award is a "serious inequity as to manifest a clear
A

abuse of discretion."
Subsection 30-3-5(7) (a) , Utah Code, concerning the
award

of

alimony

(and,

arguably,

petitions

for

modification thereof), provides in relevant part:
The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii)
the
capacity or
income;

recipients
ability to

earning
produce

(iii)
the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support;

Concerning these principles the Utah Court of
Appeals has written:
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from
becoming a public charge." Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) . It should, so
far as possible, equalize the parties7
"respective standards of living and maintain
them at a level as close as possible to the
standard of living enjoyed during
the
marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566
(Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379,
381 (Utah 1983) . " [T] he ultimate test of the
propriety of an alimony award is whether,
given all of these factors, the party
receiving alimony will be able to support him
or herself 'as nearly as possible it the
standard of living
. . . enjoyed during
marriage."' Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988) (quoting English, 565 P.2d at
411) .
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently
articulated three factors which must be

considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award: (1) the financial condition and needs
of the party seeking alimony; (2) that party's
ability to produce a sufficient income for him
or herself; and (3) the ability of the other
party to provide support. English, 565 P.2d
at 411-12; Davis, 49 P.2d at 649; Lee v. Lee,
744 P.2d 1378, 382 (Utah Ct .App. 1987) . Failure
to analyze the parties' circumstances in the
light of these three factors constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101;
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Boyle v. Boyle, 35
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah Ct .App. 1987) . As long as
the "trial court exercises its discretion
within the bounds and under the standards we
have set and has supported its decision with
adequate findings and conclusions, we will not
disturb its rulings." Davis, 749 P.2d at 649.
751 P.2d at 1146-1147. Emphasis added.
Concerning the "ability of the payor spouse", per
Subsection (iii) of the statute, that is the present
ability

based on what he earns

not based on what he

might have earned in the past. That he, as an older
worker

finding

difficulty

in

obtaining

employment, has not been able to find

better

employment

commensurate with his experience and his abilities,
does not give him the "ability" when the job and its
resultant monies simply are not present!
In the instant situation, Appellant ALAN present
earns approximately $17,000 per year. On the other
hand,

Appellee

LYNDA

earns

$50,000

per

approximately THREE TIMES MORE than ALAN.

year

The

disparity

of

earnings

and

"post-alimony"

resources is illustrated by the folio-wing chart:

ANNUALIZED
"PRE-ALIMONY" EARNINGS
ALAN

LYNDA

c. $17,000/year

$50 / 000/year

ANNUALIZED
"POST-ALIMONY" RESOURCES

LEGEND:

ALAN

LYNDA

c. $11,000/year

$56,000/year

= $5,000.

Nevertheless, the District Court ordered ALAN to pay
alimony at a rate of $500 per month, which equates to
$6,000 per year. When the $6,000 annual amount is
deducted from his side of the financial "balance sheet"
and simultaneously added to her side of the "balance
sheet", the inequity is even more extreme:
ALAN

LYNDA

Annualized income
$17,000
Alimony award
- 6,000
Net available to party $11,000

$50,000
+ 6,000
$56,000

LYNDA has $56,000 annualized "income" and ALAN has but
$11,000: LYNDA has FIVE TIMES MORE "annualized income"
(including the alimony) than does ALAN.1
Clearly, the trial court's award of the $500.00 per
month ($6,000 per year), against his total earnings of
$17,000

per

inequitable",

year,

is

clearly

particularly

in

and

context

"seriously
of

LYNDA'S

earnings and her ability to produce income for herself.
II
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION
OF VOLUNTARY UNDEREMPLOYMENT IS ERRONEOUS,
IGNORES THE EVIDENCE, AND IS ESSENTIALLY
A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
Throughout

the

modification

x

proceedings,

on

Under the federal and state tax laws, ALAN is entitled to
deduct from his "income" the $6,000 paid to LYNDA as alimony, which
she is required, under the tax laws, to include as her income. The
tax saving which ALAN receives from the tax "deduction" is minimal,
in comparison to the amount of remainder monies he's left with.
o

numerous

occasions, the District

Court

frequently

characterized ALAN'S situation as being

"voluntary

underemployment",

in

that

he

chose

to

quit

his

employment. Admittedly, ALAN did choose to terminate
his employment at Lawson. But such was only AFTER had
adopted

the compensation plan, under which ALAN'S

compensation was decreased from approximately $70,000
per year to a mere $23,000 per year. [At the time of
the compensation decrease, ALAN was facing an alimony
obligation of $16,800 per year, leaving him but $6,200
to live on. LYNDA at the time was earning $40,000 per
year, which later increased to $50,000 per year!] The
resulting

difference

in earnings

continued

to stay with Lawson, vs the $17,000 he

presently

earns

is materially

$23,000

had he

insignificant. The

District Court chose to focus more upon the "voluntary
termination"

(so

characterized

as

"voluntary

underemployment") and overlooked the actual salary
issue. Had ALAN

stayed with Lawson, at

the much

diminished salary, the Court would likewise be able to
characterize such as "voluntary underemployment".
Faced with the "arithmetic" of the situation, it
was entirely reasonable for ALAN to terminate his
employment

with Lawson,

economically-rewarding

in order

employment.

Q

to

seek

[Aside

a more

from the

"arithmetic" issues, most employees

faced with a

situation wherein their wages were "cut" to effectively
one-third of the former level

would not continue to

do the same job, alimony obligation outstanding or not.
The District Court was similarly critical, on a
repeated and continuous basis, about ALAN'S personal
choice of relocating his residence to Helena, Montana,
where he had chosen to attempt to start a new economic
future. The District Court phrased this criticality in
terms of "you (ALAN) had (alimony) obligations!" or
words to that effect. Admittedly so, but the existence
of alimony "obligations" ought not to be deemed to
constitute
precluding

the
the

permanent

"economic

free and unfettered

enslavement"
exercise

of a

citizen's constitutional right of interstate travel and
to locate his residence in any state of his choosing.
Indeed, the District Court's frequent characterization
and articulation

at times in an argumentative tone

of the "you have obligations" issue exhibited less than
a detached, impartial, neutral judicial decision: it
was if the District Court were personally involved in
ALAN'S actions vis-a-vis the court-ordered alimony
award!

in

Ill
THE $500 MONTHLY ALIMONY AWARD
IS IN EXCESS OF THE RECIPIENT'S NEEDS
During the modification proceedings LYNDA candidly
acknowledged she earned $50,000 per year, was in good
health, and had no dependents to support. In spite of
her actual earnings
those

amounts),

(and explicit abilities to earn

she

resisted

the

modification

proceeding: LYNDA'S position was to the result that
ALAN should continue to pay the $16,800 per year, in
perpetuity.2
When questioned about her "needs" and the effect
of ALAN'S "reduction" in the alimony he had actually
paid, in recognition of his own distressed financial
condition

(Lawson employment was terminated) and the

"petition to modify", her answer was to the effect that
the

reduction

required

her

to

forego

her

"Sunday

morning golfing game"!
In similar vein, she testified that when faced with
the "reduction" in alimony payments to her, she was
forced to incur "credit card debt" in the amount of
$30,000

in order

necessarily
2

her

to maintain

her

terminology)

at

"lifestyle"
the

time.

(not
She

LYNDA did concede
and the trial court did rule
that
ALAN'S support obligation would terminate, as per the statutory
amendment adopted in 1995, at the end of 23 years following the
entry of the Decree (approximately 2015) , when ALAN would be in his
late-sixties (67) !

apparently got her "lifestyle" under control, was able
to live within her $50,000 per year income, and is
incurring no new "credit card indebtedness".3
The $900 "extra" each month LYNDA has available
should likewise be examined in a long-range context,
thus: ignoring, for the sake of argument, the economic
effect of the existing "judgment" (which would fully
cover the claimed disparity) , in less than three years
her payments of $900 per month will have fully paid
back the $30,000 of

"credit card indebtedness" she

incurred.

the

Thus,

by

time

this

"modification"

proceeding (and this appeal) is terminated, she will be
the $900 "ahead", each month. She won't then need the
monies,

and ALAN

should

not

be

saddled

with

that

obligation.
The "inequity" (see Naranjo, supra) in the alimony
award

in the context both of LYNDA'S earnings and in

the context of "her needs"

3

is the simple fact that

LYNDA testified that she is "paying off" that credit card
indebtedness
not further explained and certainly not documented
by her during the proceedings
at the rate of $900 per month,
which she included in the listing of her "monthly expenses". Those
payments, arguably, are nevertheless "covered" by the $30,000+
" judgment'" the District Court awarded her for the alimony
"arrearages" not paid by ALAN following the "modification"
petition. [As previously noted, the District Court ignored its
previous ruling that during the pendency of the proceedings the
alimony would be at the $100 per month amount.]
The net effect of the "credit card repayment" expense is,
effectively, that LYNDA has $900 unencumbered income at the end of
the month: that's $900 "more" than her "needs".
-i o

her statement of "expenses" is entirely self-serving.
What person, given an essentially-unrestricted quantity
of money, isn't able to spend the entirety of that
quantity, every month month-after-month. It is almost
a truism that most persons
almost

the

entirety)

of

spend

their

the entirety

incomes,

and

(or

LYNDA

seemingly is no exception: whether the $50,000 per
year, or even $66,800

(approximately) per year, for

almost two years (during which she accrued the extra
"credit card debt", which she is not NOW accruing).
The "bottom line" is, nevertheless, LYNDA earns
presently $50,000 and ALAN earns $17,000. That is a
fact which cannot be ignored, the District

Court's

"voluntary underemployment" characterization or not.4
[See MEMORANDUM

DECISION, RECORD at 267

(line 14) .

EXHIBIT #2, hereto.] Undoubtedly, LYNDA will always be
able

to

find

the

ability

to

spend

whatever

is

available. [Although she claimed that $100 was needed

4

The District Court, in its apparent enthusiasm that its own
alimony award be fully enforced notwithstanding ALAN's involuntary
economic downturn
(including inability to find employment
commensurate with his skills and experience), ignored
in an
"abuse of discretion"
that evidence.
Given ALAN'S medical condition
life-threatening "bleeding
esophagus, coma for several days, and doctor's orders to refrain
from working for a year afterward (which he has disregarded, as he
had to provide for himself)
it is entirely reasonable that he
might choose to "slow down" and obtain employment which might be
less stressful, although less economically rewarding. There are
perhaps other things in life
time, relationships, enjoyment of
environment and leisure
which are to some (including ALAN) which
are more important that the pursuit of "the almighty dollar"!
i ^

per month for "clothing" expense, the District Court
gratuitously raised that "expense" to $300 per month,
so as to justify
It

has

decisions
alimony

in part

been

a greater alimony amount.]

frequently

observed

in

judicial

particularly in the context of the initial
award

that

the

alimony

award

might

be

adjusted to "equalize the parties' respective standards
of living". See Section 30-3-5, Utah Code. Although we
are here not dealing with an initial award of alimony,
that principle should nevertheless apply. Conversely,
the principle (i.e. "equalize the parties' standards of
living")

for which the court arguably has "continuing

jurisdiction"
circumstances

should certainly not be ignored in
where

the

alimony

award

(reinforced

within the "modification" proceeding) is utilized to
achieve an "inequitable" result in which even a greater
disparity is inflicted upon ALAN. [To illuminate the
inherent

inequity

rhetorical
below

question

in

the

present

described

in

situation,
greater

a

detail

is posed: perhaps LYNDA, now "riding high" in

an economic sense, ought to pay ALAN alimony, as she is
certainly capable of paying something and he's in need,
if

only

to

"equalize"

their

lifestyles.

Such

is

unlikely to happen, if mainly for the simple reason
that out of the hundreds if not thousands of reported

14

appellate

and unreported

unappealed

divorce cases,

there has not been a single case in which "alimony" has
been awarded to the male spouse, notwithstanding the
"gender-neutral" status5 of the present statute, the
practice

uniformly

continues:

women

are

awarded

alimony, and men aren't!
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ORDER THE DECREASED
ALIMONY AWARD BACK TO THE DATE OF THE FILING
OF THE MODIFICATION PETITION AND/OR THE
DISTRICT COURT'S "INCOME-AVERAGING"
APPROACH TO THE ALIMONY AWARD IS LIKEWISE
"INEQUITABLE" AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
In adjudicating the "modification" petition, the
District Court required the Petitioner ALAN to provide
evidence

which he did

of his "historic" (i.e. "most

recent five years") earnings (in the form of income tax
returns). Upon that basis the District Court determined
the $500 per month ($6,000 per year) alimony award. The
"income-averaging" approach

while perhaps justified

in situations where the income of a payor-spouse might
vary significantly from year-to-year (due to bonuses,

5

Such was not always the situation. See Anderson vs Anderson,
110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (Utah Supreme Court 1946) ["Alimony"
relates to support of the divorced wife] . Alimony is payment by
former husband (i.e. male) to former (wife) (i.e. female). It was
only in the 1970s when the Legislature realized that such genderbased discriminations were constitutionally impermissible that the
statute was "sterilized". Notwithstanding the current status of the
statute, the practice
i.e. alimony is awarded the wife, but not
the husband
is consistently followed, in the trial courts and in
the appellate courts. This gender-based discrimination must stop:
see argument below.
1R

economic factors such, as stock market performance,
etc.) and thus it would make sense (and be "fair") to
get an "historical average" upon which to determine
future alimony at the time of initial divorce

is

"inequitable" and improper, for at least two reasons:
First,

because

PRESENT

the

"ability

provide

practice

of

support".

ignores

the payor
See

5 (7) (a) (iii) , Utah

spouse

Section

Code.

the

In

to

30-3-

the

instant

setting, ALAN earns presently what he earns:
approximately $17,000 per year, if that! He's
not likely to earn more, as much as he perhaps
would like to (or had intended to earn, when
he moved to Montana). The immutable fact is,
simply, that he earns what he earns and the
District Court should not be able to ignore
that

fact,

the

Court's

underemployment"

"voluntary

characterizations

or

conclusions to the contrary.
Secondly, LYNDA, as recipient spouse, has
ALREADY
"alimony"

RECEIVED
by

her

reason

of

allegedly
those

deserved

in-the-past

"historic" earnings; she ought not be enabled
to receive future alimony on the basis of
incorrectly assumed "income" (which IN FACT is

16

simply

not

there),

which

ALAN

does

not

presently have, on the basis that he had
income in those amounts years ago! She's not
entitled to "double-dip" in this manner.
In similar vein, the District Court's award of the
$3 0,000 "judgment" against ALAN (for unpaid alimony
accruing "post-petition") during the pendency of the
"modification" proceeding and/or the District Court's
award of the $500 per month prospectively (from the
date of actual entry thereof) and no retroactively (to
the

date

of

filing

for

the

"modification")

is

"inequitable" and imprudent. "Inequitable" because that
approach (i.e. no retroactivity to filing date) ignores
the evidence: ALAN didn't have the income then to pay
the $1600 then any more than he has the income to pay
the $1600 now. If the reduction is justified
most certainly is

which it

now on the basis that he doesn't

(present and future tense) have the earnings and income
to pay the $1600, the retroactive reduction is likewise
justified on the basis that he didn't have the income
in past

(after

the

filing

of

the

"modification"

petition)!
The non-retroactive approach is likewise imprudent
because it forces the party-litigants and the Courts to
engage in a "hurry-up" manner of litigating complex and

17

enduring issues, on the basis of assumed, artificial
urgency and perhaps without full basis to develop the
necessary facts and/or resources to litigate the case.
[That ALAN resides out-of-state and/or doesn't have a
huge war chest to "bankroll" this litigation hasn't
made the case move any quicker.] Regardless of how
quickly the case moved or is perceived to should have
moved, the fact that ALAN was earning what he was
earning hasn't changed! In fact, that he has continued
in his diminished earning capacity

a fact that LYNDA

and the District Court would like to conveniently
ignore

for several years should be seen as a benefit

to the judicial process, rather than as a personallyinflicted "penalty" upon ALAN. [It is not necessarily
his fault that he just can't jump into a new position
wherein he earns the $70,000 he historically earned
prior to 2000, after decades of working for Lawson and
working himself into a supervisory position. Regardless
of

his

experience

and

qualifications

for

such a

position, a willing employer has to be found to pay him
that much. And lots of times employers are, for reasons
justified

or

not

(i.e.

were

this

not

the

Congressionally-perceived practice, we wouldn't have
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and similar
statutes on-the-books) . ALAN earns what he earns and

-I O

the Court and/or LYNDA simply cannot change the fact.
ALAN'S age is what it is; his health condition is what
it is. And those facts cannot be changed!
ALAN'S situation is not merely the result of a
"temporary" decrease in income; for all intents and
purposes,

his

permanent.

earnings

[If

ought

those

to be

earnings

deemed
should

to be
change

substantially, LYNDA would arguably have the right to
petition for a modification upwards.] See, in contrast,
Cox vs Cox, 877 P.d 1262 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994)
[historic

review

of

income

justified

where

party

experiences temporary decrease in income or unusual
prosperity during one year], and Olson vs Olson, 704
P. 2d 564 (Utah Supreme Court 1985) [temporary decrease
in ex-husband's income]. ALAN'S situation is simply NOT
"temporary";
seemingly

it

is, unfortunately,

PERMANENT

(or

so) , and must be judicially recognized!

Wishing it otherwise by looking in the past will not
change the future!
IV
THE COURT SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE ALIMONY AWARD
IN THIS CASE AND AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
FOR ALL OTHER CASES
The instant fact situation (LYNDA earns $50,000 per
year, ALAN earns but $17,000 and she wants $16,800

or

at

in

least

$6,000

of

that
1Q

$17,000

each

year,

effective perpetuity, illuminates the inequity of the
situation, in this specific case and in an across-theboard setting for all divorcing spouses.
What is it about "alimony" which is so imbued with
judicial

wisdom

and

jurisprudential

insight,

particularly in the Twenty-first Century? Why is it
that

some

ex-spouses

probably

about

one-half,

because statistically (but hard statistics are probably
not available) about one-half of ex-wives "waive" any
alimony award

pay alimony, and others are under no

similar obligation? Merely at the whim of the recipient
spouse, even at the nominal amount of "one dollar per
year"

(in order to keep the door open, in case of

unanticipated claims or needs in the future)? Given the
fact that the Legislature has adopted the "no fault"
(i.e.

"irreconcilable

differences")

grounds

for

divorce, is alimony to an ex-wife even defensible as a
matter of public policy?
Persons marry for a variety of reasons; those
reasons include but are not necessarily limited to
love, romance, economic reasons, companionship, desire
to

have

and

raise

(but

sometimes

only

to

have)

children, and a million other reasons perceived by the
private

citizen-parties

to

those

marriages.

The

resultant marriages are as diverse and unique as are
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the number of marriages. The Legislature and the Court
generally

except in "domestic violence" and "abuse"

situations

do not care about the quality or tenor of

those "marriage relationships". But about one-half of
those marriages will, over time, end in divorce. The
Legislature

has

selected

the

District

Courts

to

adjudicate and implement general law to grant divorce
to the parties.
judicial

and/or

effectuate
effective

[Numerous other states have nonnon-adversarial

divorce.]
and

Those

complete

proceedings

divorces

severing

of

result
the

to

in an

"marital

relationship", and the parties are free and able to go
on their way
In

the

except in the case of alimony.
alimony

context,

now

arguably

with

"legislative authorization" but enforceable at the whim
and/or "needs" of the recipient ex-wife, the courts
feel the power and responsibility to award alimony. Why
is this so? Why
parties marry

for all the reasons that private
is the "duty of economic support" so

significant that it continues, in some cases (at the
ex-wife's

claim

and

demand)

after

the

marital

relationship has long since terminated and the parties
are judicially sent on their way? Why are the two
parties essentially absolved of the entirety of their
"marital" obligations

whatever those are, as the

private spouses decide amongst themselves sans state or
legal

involvement

except

for

the

continuing

obligation to pay alimony?
Formerly alimony has been judicially justified on
the basis of assuring that the recipient "ex-wife" (so
stated) would not "become a public charge"

(go on

welfare) . See Porco vs Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah Court
of Appeals 1988); Paffel vs Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100
(Utah 1986); Jones vs Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985); and Rosendahl vs Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870 (Utah
Court of Appeals 1994), cert, denied 883 (Utah Supreme
Court 1994) . Not only is this alleged
public

charge"

justification

"not become

disingenuous

(and

inapplicable) in the instant situation6, but history
and present "divorce" practice is to the contrary. [For
example, hypothetically the divorcing "ex--wife" could,
as many do, "waive" her claim to alimony. No alimony
would be decreed. The State wouldn't be involved in
that "waiver" specifically, or in the private "divorce"
action generally. Thereafter the ex-wife could apply
"for welfare" and her "alimony" (or non-alimony) status
would be immaterial. Alimony not being awarded in the
first

6

instance,

the

State

would

be

powerless

to

The Court could take "judicial notice" of the fact that
LYNDA, earning $50,000 per year, is not entitled to "public
welfare".

intervene in the then-closed divorce and force the exhusband

to make payments, thus relegating

him to

"second class" citizenship by reason of the "public
charge" responsibilities which the public-at-large has
chosen to incur. The resultant "private welfare system"
imposed upon a few cannot be justified and defended.
In

the

Twenty-first

Century,

the

economic

opportunities for women (as "ex-wives" or not) abound.
Statistically, women constitute presently approximately
one-half

(sometimes

more

than

one-half)

of

the

"classes" of medical schools, law schools and other
post-graduate and professional training. We are no
longer

in

the

archaic,

anachronistic

time-frame

centuries ago, in "merry old England", when concepts of
"alimony" were first developed, but have subsequently
been changed

(in England) , but were

"imported" to

America with the colonists and have been incorrectly
applied, basically on the basis "that we've always done
it this way". Some states
as a matter of state policy

notably Texas

preclude,

the award of alimony to

the ex-spouse!
If the "marriage" were

hypothetically

strictly

one of "economic" or "financial" significance, that
"marriage" might be characterized as a "partnership"
might like a business. Yet at the break-up of the
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business and the resultant adversarial (i.e. judicial)
proceeding if the parties couldn't "agree", would the
District

Court

feel

empowered

to

award

seemingly

permanent, on-going economic payments from the one
party to be paid to the other party? Certainly not! And
certainly not in recognition of an "fault" on the part
of one party

(business partner) or the other. [The

Legislature's abandonment of the "fault" adjudication
of the "grounds" necessary for divorce

together with

the instant parties' utilization of "irreconcilable
differences" as their "grounds" for divorce, precludes
LYNDA from asserting anything other than "she and/or
ALAN just didn't agree" on things any more and she
wanted a divorce. Regardless of his intentions

and/or

regardless (obviously) of the parties' commitments and
promises to each other at the inception of marriage,
most of which were not only vaguely stated, if at all,
because the parties were "in love with each other" and
nothing else mattered, including what happened were
divorce to enter the picture decades down the road

to

the contrary. She's got "grounds", and the marriage
ends

except for her "alimony".7

7

The legislative recognition of "fault" of the parties in the
marital break-up is unavailing and confusing. First, in light of
the "irreconcilable differences" grounds allowed by statute and
relied upon the instant parties. Secondly, due to the inherently
vague and ambiguous legal standard established for the private
parties within the privately-decided "marriage" relationship. And
O/l

Utah appellate decisions have previously encouraged
the trial courts to avoid, where possible "long-lasting
financial

entanglements"

in

effecting

property

settlement awards. See Marchant vs Marchant, 734 P.2d
199 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987) [extended distribution
of retirement benefits]. The instant case is exactly
that situation: LYNDA, earning $50,000 per year and
clearly able to take care of herself (and responsible
for no one else), is certainly not IN NEED thereof.
Particularly in the face of the simple fact that ALAN
earns so much less! ALAN has

as he was then able

has paid LYNDA almost $140,000 in alimony already.
The District Court's $500 per month is clearly a
"serious inequity" (Naranjo, supra) in that context and
constitutes an

"abuse of discretion". The $500 per

month alimony award must be overturned.
CONCLUSION
LYNDA earns $50,000 per year. She's in good health
and

has

no

dependents.

Her

living

expenses,

when

properly understood and characterized, are well within

thirdly, not only do the parties not know how to ascertain "fault"
and "who is a fault?" for the divorce
which the Legislature has
said it doesn't matter
but it is a ludicrous and incredible
judicial endeavor to engage in such a "fault" determination, if
only for the "alimony" issue! Do the courts really "want to go
there"? When one examines how much judicial time
trial court and
appellate court
has been spent on "alimony" resolution and
imposition, one comes to the conclusion that such has been a very
"slippery slope" indeed.
9R

that income, to allow her to support herself.
On the other hand, ALAN earns about one-third of
what

LYNDA

earns

and,

but

for

the

gender-based

discrimination upon which alimony awards have been
historically approached, should be receiving alimony
from her, so as to "equalize" his standard of living to
hers.
The District Court's award of the $6,000 per year
alimony award is, in light of the evidence, a "serious
inequity" (Naranjo, supra) in light of the immutable
evidence before the Court and constitutes an "abuse of
discretion" which must be overturned.
The District Court's refusal to make the "alimony
modification" retroactive to the date of filing is
likewise improper and must be overturned.
If the Court of Appeals can honestly say, in good
conscience and recognition of the facts, that it is not
clearly

a

"serious

inequity"

to

award

LINDA

approximately $56,000 worth of annual "income" (i.e.
earnings and alimony) , while ALAN has but one-fifth of
that amount (approximately $11,000: income, less the
$6,000 in alimony), then the District Court judgment
should be affirmed. But if
and otherwise, aside

personalities, judicial

the unfairness and

"serious

inequity" is apparent within those simple facts, then

the Court must reverse the District Court and/or enter
a more realistic alimony award, perhaps as low as $0
(or the proverbial "dollar a year", until modified by
future Court order).
The

Court

opportunity
illogical
pursued

should

nevertheless

utilize

this

blatantly illuminating the unfairness and
extreme

to

which

"alimony"

awards

are

as an opportunity to revisit the whole idea

of alimony in general, regardless of the statutory
provisions.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of November,
2004.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LYNDA F. JONES,
ORDER IN RE: JUDGEMENT
CONTEMPT AND OTHER
Petitioner,
MATTERS
v.
Civil No. 914900581DA
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

ALAN D. JONES,
Respondent.
oOo

The above referenced matter came on regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on June 4, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Petitioner was present and
represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present
and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. The Court having heard and considered the
evidence adduced in this matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Respondent is in arrears regarding his Court ordered alimony payments to

Petitioner.

EXHIBIT #1

2.

Respondent has the ability to have made alimony payments to Petitioner.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The Respondent is to serve 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. This jail time is stayed
for 10 days to allow for the Respondent time to purge the jail sentence. Jail time may be purged with
a $1,000.00 check or money order received by Petitioner's counsel by June 14,2003. A $25,000 00
warrant for Respondent's arrest will be held until June 16, 2003, to allow Respondent to make this
payment. If Respondent does not make this initial payment, Petitioner's counsel shall notify the
Court and the warrant will be issued immediately.
2. In addition to the payment of $1,000.00, Respondent is to pay $100.00 per month to
Petitioner. The first $100.00 is due on or before July 31, 2003, thereafter due the last day of each
month. If at any time the monthly $100.00 payment is not made, the arrest warrant shall issue.
3. Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce shall be dismissed unless all medical
records relating to any medical reasons for Respondent not working over the past year are produced.
If these records have not been produced to Petitioner's counsel by noon, June 11,2003, Respondent's
Petition to Modify shall be dismissed with prejudice.
4. Not withstanding the above, Respondent's Petition to Modify shall be heard by this Court
on August 13, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. At this time, Respondent should be prepared to present to the
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EXHIBIT #1

Court specific information regarding whether the Respondent chose to leave his previous
employment or whether he
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foregoing Order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days of aftftfc'servica^f
this Order.
DATED thisc)5 day of June, 2003.
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West Jordan, UT 84088
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA F. JONES

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO, 914900581

Petitioner/
vs.
ALAN D. JONES,
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on Augusc
14, 2003.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the

matter under advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to
submit

post-trial

briefs

and

additional

documentation.

petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30, 2003.

The
The

respondent did not file a post-trial brief and the time for doing
so has now expired.
The

Court

respondent's

has

Petition

now

had

to

an

Modify,

opportunity
seeking

to

to

review

the

eliminate

the

respondent's alimony obligation, along with the remaining pleadings
that have been filed and the exhibits that were presented into
evidence.

The Court has also revisited portions of the trial

testimony and counsel's closing arguments.

Finally, the Court has

reviewed the petitioner's Post-Trial Brief and the case law cited

EXHIBIT # 2

JONES V. JONES
therein.
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Therefore, the Court is now fully advised and rules as

stated, herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The

respondent

contends

that

his

Petition, to

Modify

is

premised on two changes in circumstance that occurred subsequent to
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and which were not contemplated
by either party.

Specifically, the respondent

points to the

substantial reduction in his income or earning capacity and to the
petitioner's increased ability to provide for her own economic
well-being because of the gradual, but

steady

increase

in her

income and earning capacity.
The Court's preliminary indication at the bench trial was that
there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances
which

requires

obligation.

a

The

modification
Court

now

in

the

clarifies

respondent's
that

this

alimony

change

in

circumstance arises solely because of the petitioner's increased
ability to meet her own financial needs and not because of the
respondent's decision to earn less than he is capable of earning,
particularly given his lengthy experience in the sales industry.
Specifically, the Court reiterates its prior finding that the
respondent has voluntarily reduced his earning capacity with no
basis for doing so.

In other words, the Court is persuaded that

the respondent did not have to leave Lawson Products because of a

EXHIBIT #2

JONES V. JONES
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change in the management scheme or because his earning potential
would have decreased, or for any other viable reason.
Further,

the

Court

is

unpersuaded

that

the

respondent's

current underemployment is necessitated by any health concerns or
physical

impediments.

To the contrary, the respondent's trial

testimony was that he is currently in good health.

In the end, the

respondent's counsel articulated it best when he said that his
client left Lawson Products because he simply intended to earn
less.

Counsel went on to question whether there was anything

morally wrong with such a decision and how long the respondent
should continue to be "enslaved" by his alimony obligation.

The

Court addressed these issues during the bench trial by emphasizing
that she is

concerned only with the legal issue of whether the

respondent's

voluntary

obligation.

underemployment

obviates

his

alimony

The Court concludes that while a person may choose to

change careers or choose to earn less; this voluntary act does
not

obviate

alimony.

Therefore,

this

Court

imputes

to

the

respondent the full amount of income represented by his earning
history prior to his voluntary departure from Lawson Products.
In contrast to the respondent's decision to voluntarily leave
his job in order to

"earn less,"

the petitioner has

steadily

progressed in her career and now earns approximately double what
she earned at the time of the Decree of Divorce.

EXHIBIT #2

Ironically,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

however, it is the fruits of the petitioner's hard work and
diligence that now provide the sole legal basis for the respondent
to claim a change in circumstances and seek to modify his alimony
obligation.
Having determined that the petitioner's earning capacity has
dramatically increased, the question becomes to what extent the
Court should modify the respondent's alimony obligation. Using the
petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a reference point, the
Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to an amount of
alimony that will address her unmet financial needs.

In this

regard, the Court finds that the petitioner has understated those
unmet needs to be approximately $3 00 per month.

Taking into

account a reasonable amount of expenses associated with clothing
and dry-cleaning, the Court concludes that the petitioner's unmet
needs are closer to $500 per month.

Therefore, the Court grants

the respondent's Petition, finding a change in petitioner's income,
and orders a modification of respondent's alimony from $1,400 to
$500 per month.
Counsel for the petitioner is to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law consistent with, but not limited to, this

EXHIBIT #2

JONES V. JONES
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Each party is to bear their own attorney's

fees
Dated t h i s

^ iday
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oi October

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LYNDA F. JONES,
ORDER AND JUDGEMENT
Petitioner,
v.
Civil No. 914900581DA
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

ALAN D. JONES,
Respondent.
0Oo

The Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on Trial before this Court on
August 14,2003. The Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart
Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer,
Esq. Based upon the evidence produced at Trial and the record herein and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Petitioner is awarded a judgment in the amount of $29,700.00 against

Respondent as and for unpaid alimony for the months of November 2001 through August 2003.

2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §15-1-4, statutory interest shall accure on this

judgment until paid in full.
3.

All remaining issues pertaining to the Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of

Divorce have been taken under advisement and shall be addressed in a separate Order and Judgment.
DATED this JJ±_ day of September, 2003.
BY THE COURT

^>r<
CSLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Rule 4-504 Notice
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that ar
foregoing Order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days of 3§%£ service^pf
this Order.
DATED this

day of

2003.
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN

AYES
for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
...
0Oo
LYNDA F. JONES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Petitioner,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ALAN D.JONES,

:

Respondent.

:

Civil No. 914900581DA
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

oOo
The Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on trial before the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on August 14, 2003, at 2:00 p.m.

The Petitioner

was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes of Dart, Adamson & Donovan. The
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. Both Petitioner
and Respondent testified under oath and the court received documents in evidence offered by both
Petitioner and Respondent. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under
advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to submit Post-Trial Briefs and additional
documentation as requested by the Court. The Petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30,

EXHIBIT #4

2003. The Respondent did not file a Post-Trial Brief within the time period allotted by the Court to
do so. The Court, after considering the evidence and testimony produced at trial, the arguments of
counsel and the record herein, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This Court finds that the Respondent alleged two changes of circumstance in this

Petition to Modify which he contends support his claim that Petitioner's alimony award should be
eliminated, to wit: Respondent's alleged substantial reduction in his income and/or earning capacity
and the Petitioner's increased ability to provide for her own financial needs.
2.

This Court finds that there has been a substantial and material change of

circumstances which requires a modification in the Respondent's alimony obligation. This change
of circumstance, however, arises solely because of the Petitioner's increased ability to meet her own
financial needs and not because of the Respondent's decision to earn less then he is capable of
earning, particularly given his lengthy experience in the sales industry.
3.

This Court reiterates its previous finding that the Respondent has voluntarily reduced

his earning capacity with no basis for doing so. Specifically, the Court is not persuaded that the
Respondent had to leave his employment with Lawson Products because of a change in management
scheme or because his earning potential would have decreased, or for any other viable reason.
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4.

This Courtfindsthat the Respondent's current underemployment is not necessitated

by any health concerns or physical impediments of the Respondent. To the contrary, the Respondent
testified at trial that he was currently in good health. This Court agrees with the contention of
Respondent's counsel that the Respondent left Lawson Products simply because he intended to earn
less money.
5.

This Courtfindsthat while a person is free to change careers or choose to earn less

money; this voluntary act does not obviate one's alimony obligation. Therefore, this Court will
impute to the Respondent the full amount of income represented by his earning history prior to his
voluntary departure from Lawson Products.
6.

In contrast to the Respondent's voluntary choice to leave his previous employment

to earn less money, the Petitioner has steadily progressed in her career and now earns approximately
double of what she earned at the time of the Decree of Divorce. This Court further finds it ironic
that it is the fruits of the Petitioner's hard work and diligence that now provide the sole legal basis
for the Respondent to claim a change of circumstance and seek to modify his alimony obligation.
7.

This Courtfindsthat, using the Petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a reference

point, that the Petitioner is entitled to an amount of alimony that will meet her unmet financial needs.
8.

This Court finds that the Petitioner's attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per

month is understated. By taking into account the reasonable amount of expenses associated with
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clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court finds that the Petitioner's unmet financial needs are closer to
$500.00 per month.
9.

This Court finds that having substantiated a change in the Petitioner's income, that

the Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be granted and his alimony awarded
reduced from $1,400.00 per month to $500.00 per month.
10.

This Courtfindsthat each party should bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees

incurred in connection with this action.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this action;

2.

Grounds exist for this Court to modify the Decree of Divorce as set forth above; and

3.

An Order Modifying Decree of Divorce should enter consistent with the Findings of

Fact, above.
DATED this ^

'day of January, 2004.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
Third District Court Judge
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNDA F. JONES.
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
v.

Civil No. 91490058IDA
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

ALAN D. JONES,
Respondent.
0O0

The Respondent's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on trial before the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on August 14, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. The Petitioner
was present and represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes of Dart, Adamson & Donovan. The
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. Both Petitioner
and Respondent testified under oath and the court received documents in evidence offered by both
Petitioner and Respondent. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under
advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to submit Post-Trial Briefs and additional
documentation as requested by the Court. The Petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30,
Signed on 1/27/04, Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
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2003. The Respondent did notfilea Post-Trial Brief within the time period allotted by the Court to
do so. The Court, after considering the evidence and testimony produced at trial, the arguments of
counsel and the record herein, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having made
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Effective September 1, 2003, the Respondent's alimony obligation is modified to

$500.00 per month, payable to the Petitioner until her re-marriage, co-habitation, either parties'
death, or the expiration of 21 years from the date of entry of the parties' original Decree of Divorce.
2.

All provisions of the parties' original Decree of Divorce not expressly modified herein

shall remain in full force and effect.
3.

Each party shall pay his or her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection

with this action.
DATED this /

/day of January, 2004.
BYT

LESLIE A. LEWIS
Third District Court Judge
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